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A. INTRODUCTION 
During the last forty years, family law has undergone profound changes throughout 
western industrialised countries. N otwithstanding rninor set-backs, the development 
has been surprisingly even. However, this legal evolution is but a reflection of and, at 
the same time, part of the developments occurring in society in a whole, as is already 
becoming apparent in official statistics. 
The most salient feature is the rise in the divorce rate. Since the 1970s, it has more than 
doubled in nearlyall countries. In many countries, the percentage of marriages ending 
in divorce has now reached 40 to 50 per cent. The high number of divorces brings 
about, in turn, manifold further developments. These are, on the one hand, the rapidly 
increasing number of children living in stepfamilies and, on the other hand, the 
growing number of single parent families. 
Developments parallel to the rising divorce rate are the increase in the age of first 
marriage and the general decrease in marriages as a whole. Simultaneously, cohabita-
tion has increased in all countries, in some places dramatically. This is consistent with 
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the fact that the number of out-of-wedlock births has increased considerably during 
the last decades. Recent years have finally observed an increasing 'coming-out' and 
acceptance of same-sex relationships. 
With regard to the number of births, a general, in some countries dramatic decline 
in fertility rates can be observed. Since about 1965, the reproduction rate of the 
population has fallen to a below-replacement level in many developed countries. On 
the other hand, the various options available in the area of medically-assisted 
procreation are in steadily increasing demand among couples who still remain 
childless. 
The socio-demographic developments are closely linked with, and strongly based on 
a profound change in values. This shift can be characterised, on the one hand, as 
secularisation, meaning the long-term societal decline in the importance of religion, 
and, on the other hand, as emancipation. Indeed, the second half of the twentieth 
century has been marked by the emancipation of women and the levelling~out of 
gender inequalities, which has brought about fundamental changes in society and, 
consequently, in the law. The second major emancipation movement ofthe twentieth 
century concerned the rights of the child, the major achievement of which is that 
children are now increasinglyperceived as subjects rather than as simple objects. This 
change in values has significantly contributed toward the development of what one 
might call the plurality of private living arrangements. In addition to the traditional 
marriage-based nuclear family, there is an increasing diversity of family forms: childless 
marriages, single parent families, reconstituted families, families constituted by 
medically-assisted procreation, cohabitation withoutmarriage, same-sexcouples and 
more. 
Family law could and, indeed, has not stayed unresponsive to the profound socio-
demographic changes. The legal development can be circumscribed as a movement 
'from status to contract and relation' .1 Legal regulation in family law is becoming less 
and less oriented towards status. The trend is to g~ve priority to the autonomous 
private regulation of the private sphere, on the one hand and, where an arnicable 
settlement is not possible, to take the actual relationships and not the existing status 
as a reference point, on the other. 
Status has also not only lost its relevance in the area of marriage law, but also in child 
law. Children born in and out ofwedlock are largely, if not completely, placed on equal 
footing in practically all legal systems. The primary focus of the pertinent legal rules 
I. SCHWENZER, Vom Status zur Realbeziehung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987). 
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is on the welfare of the child. Thus, emphasis is placed on the importance ofboth 
parents for the child and, accordingly, on joint parental custody, regardless of whether 
the parents are married, divorced, or not married, whether they live together or not. 
However, it cannot be ignored that joint custody, and thewhole underlying concept 
of shared parental responsibility, may lead to further problems in high conflict cases. 
The actual relationship is also gaining importance as regards the law conceming 
relations with foster and stepchildren. The increasing recognition of the quality of 
children as individual subjects·in all procedures bearing influence on their interests 
is another fundamental innovation. The child' s right to be heard and the instrument 
of child advocacy, especially, enjoys widespread recognition thanks to the U nited 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter 'CRC'), to which the 
majority of states focused on here are parties. 
All of these developments have led to many legislators thoroughly revising the domestic 
rules conceming child law.2 
B. AFFILIATION 
I. MOTHERHOOD 
Most legal systems still firmly base the law conceming motherhood on the principle 
of mater semper certa est, namely that the woman who gives birth to the child is his 
or her legal mother. 3 France and some legal systems closely affiliated to France, 
however, do not follow this principle. In these systems, a woman only becomes the 
legal mother of the child either by designation in the record ofbirth,4 by acknowledg-
ing him or her, or byvirtue of the so-called possession d' etat, or the lived-out mother-
SeeAustria: Kindschaftsrechts-Änderungsgesetz2001; Belgium: Titre VII duLivreI du Codecivil, revised 
on 20 October 2005, Lai de 13 mars 2003 modifiant le Code judicaire en ce qui concerne l' adoption, 
Loi de 24 avril 2003 reformant l' adoption; France: Ord. n° 2005-759 du 4 juillet 2005 en vigueur le 
lerjuillet2006,L. n° 2002-305du4mars2002,L. n° 72-3du3janvier 1972;Canada:LawReform 1980; 
Germany: Kindschaftsrechtsreformgesetz 1998; Great Britain: Children Act 1989, Adoption and Children 
Act 2002; The N etherlands: Act of 24 december 1997 concerning the revision of the law on parentage 
and the law on adoption; Serbia: Family Act of 26 February 2005; USA: Uniform Parentage Act 
2000/2002. In most countries, further reforms were brought about by statutes on medically-assisted 
procreation, as weil as on the recognition of same-sex partnerships. 
National Report Austria, A.III. l.; National Report Belgium, A.III. para. 19; National Report Canada, 
LC.L; National Report China/Macau, A.III.1.; National Report Croatia, A.II.l.; National Report 
Denmark, A. Matemity; National Report England, I.A.a) para. 4; National Report Germany, A.1.1.; 
National Report Japan, A.I. l .; National Report The N etherlands, A. Presumptions/Establishment 
ofMotherhood; National Report Serbia, A.II.; National Report Switzerland, II.B. 
Arts. 310-3(1), 311-25 Code Civil. Belgium: Art. 313 § 1 Code Civil. 
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child relationship. Furthermore, France5 recognises an accouchement sous X, whereby 
a wo man may give birth anonymously and, thereby, escape legal motherhood. In 2003, 
the European Court ofHuman Rights held the accouchement sous X tobe compatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights.6 
In recent years? the possibility of accouchement sous X, as weil as the so-called 'baby 
flap', has been discussed in several other countries. In all such countries, however, it 
was decided that such a possibilitywould run contraryto the child' s right to know his 
or her own origins, and was therefore rejected. 7 However, Austria, at least, has enacted 
a law whereby the act of abandoning a baby at a so-called 'baby flap' is no longer 
a criminal offence. This child is then treated as a foundling.8 
In those legal systems that are firmly grounded in the mater semper certa est rule, the 
possibilityto challenge motherhood is naturally excluded.9 In any case, there are only 
a few legal systems that acknowledge such a possibility. As can be expected, this is the 
case in France if motherhood is based upon acknowledgement.10 To a larger extent, 
even Belgium, Romania, Croatia and Serbia recognise this possibility regardless of 
the status of the child. 11 
II. FATHERHOOD 
Whereas in most legal systems, the general distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate children has been abolished in recent decades, large differences still exist 
in establishing fatherhood based upon status. However, there are already certainlegal 
systems that genuinely place children born in and out of wedlock on equal footing 
when it comes to the establishment of fatherhood. 12 
10 
11 
12 
4 
cf. Art. 341-1 Code Civil. 
cf. in this regard ECHR 13 February 2003, Case No. 42326/98, Odievre v. France, (2003) FamPra.ch, 
371 et seqq. 
National Report Belgium, A.III. para. 23. 
See National ReportAustria, A.III. l. See also National Report Romania, A.III.1., wherebyanonymous 
birth is 'not encouraged'; National Report Belgium, A.III, para. 23. 
National Report Denmark, A. Maternity; National Report Switzerland, II.B. 
Art. 332(1) Code Civil. See also National Report China/Macau, A.III.l., whereby motherhood 
established by declaration may be challenged. 
cf. National Report Belgium, A.III. para. 24; National Report Croatia, A.II.2.; National Report 
Romania, A.III.2., which allows this right for the entire life of the child; National Report Serbia, A.II. 
National Report Canada, I.B. l.: birth certificate prevails. 
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1. Children born in wedlock 
a. Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant 
All legal systems considered here are still governed by the principle of pater est quem 
nuptiae demonstrant. This means that the first and most important factor to establish 
a presumption concerning fatherhood is whether the man is married to the mother 
at the time ofbirth. However, only an ever-decreasing number oflegal systems still 
follow this principle strictly. Thus, Japan still adheres to a very strict pater est 
presumption, whereby the husband is presumed to be the father of the child if the 
mother gives birth after 200 days after the conclusion of the marriage and within 300 
days after its dissolution. 13 With respect to the commencement of the pater est 
presumption, most legal systems now hold that it applies if the child is born within 
any time after the conclusion of the marriage. With respect to when the presumption 
ceases to arise, these systems, however, still focus on the dissolution of the formal bond 
of marriage, and not on the practical end of the relationship.14 In contrast, some legal 
systems have adapted the pater est rule so as to better represent actual circumstances, 
by focussing on separation of some description. 15 France and related countries have 
even gone one step further; if no actual relationship (possession d'etat) between the 
husband and the child ex:ists, it is up to the mother to decide whether she has the child 
registered naming the husband as father or not; here, the pater est presumption does 
not apply. 16 In some of the states that have, in the meantime, established a registered 
partnership ( civil union) for heterosexual couples, the pater estpresumption extends 
to the registered partner. 17 
In a very modern approach, a newtype of pater estpresumption. has recently emerged 
in Canada: the presumed parenthood of the female spouse or registered partner of the 
birth-giving mother.18 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
cf National Report Japan, A.II.l. 
cf. National Report Austria, A.II.l.b); National Report China/Macau, A.II.l.; National Report 
Germany, A.II. l .a), but only if a divorce petition is not pending; National Report Greece, A.II.1.1.; 
National Report Romania, A.II.1.; National Report Serbia, A.I.A.; National Report Switzerland, 
II.C.2. 
National Report Belgium, A.II. para. 7; National Report Denmark, A. Establishment of Paternity; 
France: Art. 313(1) Code Civil; Norway: § 3(1) ChildrenAct. 
cf. Art. 314 Code Civil, although it may be reinstated by proving that the husband is the father, Art. 
329; National Report Canada, I.B.l. 
National Report Canada, I.B. l. Fn. 11; National Report China/Macau, A.II. l., referring to ade facto 
union; but see National Report The N etherlands, A. Establishment of Fatherhood: presumption 
has not been ex:tended to different-sexregistered partnerships; National ReportBelgium, A.II. para. 7. 
National Report Canada, I. La filiation maternelle. See also National Report USA, II., where, in the 
states that recognize same-sex unions, a presumption of parentage based on the traditional marital 
presumption applies to the same-sex partner. 
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b. Challenging fatherhood 
Historically, the pater est presumption not only protected the child in times when 
biological father hood was difficult to establish; one ofits primary concerns was to give 
the husband the right to decide who should belong to the family or not. Thus, 
challenging fatherhood was only possible by the husband himself. This view is only 
still followed by Japanese law nowadays, which is, however, being increasingly 
criticised. 19 In all other legal systems, the number of persons entitled to challenge 
fatherhood has been steadily increasing. 
In addition to the hus band' s right, most legal systems nowrecognise the mother' s right 
to challenge the fatherhood of the presumed husband. As early as 1994, the European 
Court ofHuman Rights derived this right from Art. 8 ECHR.20 In many legal systems, 
there is no difference between the right to challenge of the presumed father and of the 
mother.21 Besides Japan, Switzerland22 is the only other country that excludes the 
mother from challenging fatherhood. 
Increasingly, the child is also granted the right to challenge the husband' s fatherhood. 
This is in line with the growing tendency to recognise the child' s right to know his or 
her origins.23 Thus, more and more legal systems allow a child of majority age to 
challenge fatherhood without regard to the factual family situation. 24 Only a few legal 
systems restrict this right in order to protect ongoing farnily relationships. U nder Swiss 
law, the child may only challenge fatherhood if, during his or her minority, the parents 
have ceased to live together. 25 Again, Belgium only provides for the child' s possibility 
to challenge father hood if there is no possession d' etat. 26 
The most modern trend is to allow the biological father to challenge the husband's 
fatherhood. Norway takes the most extensive approach, granting this right without 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
6 
National Report Japan, A.II.2. 
ECHR 27 October 1995, Case No. 29/1993/424/503, series A. 297-C,Kroon v. The Netherlands. 
National Report Belgium, A.II. para. 13; National Report China/Macau, A.II.2.; National Report 
Croatia, A.I.2.; National Report Denmark, A. Challenging Paternity; France: Art. 333 Code Civil; 
National Report Germany, A.II.2.; National Report The Netherlands, A. Challenging Fatherhood; 
National Report USA, I.; Norway: § 17 Children Act. 
National Report Switzerland, II.C.5. 
This right is approved by National Report Romania, A.II.2. 
National Report Belgium, A.II. para. 13: four years after majority; National Report China/Macau, 
A.II.l., which states that the child may challenge at any time; National Report Croatia, A.II.2.; 
National Report The Netherlands, A. Challenging Fatherhood. 
National Report Switzerland, II.C.5. 
National Report Belgium, A.II. para. 13. 
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any restrictions. 27 In most other legal systems, to the extent that this possibility is made 
available at all, it is subjected to a time limit.28 Under German law, a challenge by the 
putative biological father is, among other matters, only allowed if there is no longer 
a social relationship between the child and the presumed father. 29 Similar restrictions 
are also found in French and Belgian law, which, again, prohibit a challenge if there 
is a possession d' etat. 30 Likewise, the English judiciary, in deciding whether a putative 
father may apply for a blood test, primarily asks whether the child would benefit from 
having contact with him.31 
There are profound differences with respect to the time limits within which a challenge 
of fatherhood has tobe brought by the persons concerned. However, in recent years, 
a trend can be observed in setting increasingly longer periods in this regard.32 
2. Children born out of wedlock 
a. Attribution of fatherhood 
There are only a limited number oflegal systems that - besides the classical pater est 
presumption-presume that the man who is cohabiting with the mother, or who has 
the possession d' etat, is the father of the child. 33 In all other legal systems, fatherhood 
of a child born out of wedlock can only be established by either voluntary acknowl-
edgement or adjudication. 
§§ 6 and28a Chi/drenActas amendedin 2003. See also National Report China/Macau,A.II.2., which, 
although not requiring a time limit, states that ' [ ... ] according to the circumstances, the paternity 
of the mother's husband is noticeably improbable'. 
National Report Greece, A.II.1.1.; National Report USA, III.A.; National Report Denmark, A. 
Challenging Paternity; National Report England, I.A.b) para. 6: not allowed; National Report 
Netherlan ds, A. Challenging Fatherhood; National Report Serbia, A.I.A., which requires the putative 
father to simultaneously request that hebe established as the father of the child; National Report 
Belgium, A.Il. para. 13: de lege ferenda. 
National Report Germany, A.Il.2. See also National Report USA, 1. 
F rance: Art. 333 ( 2) Code Civil, but only if the possession d' etat has lasted at least five years from birth 
or acla1owledgement; Belgium: Art. 318 § 1 I Code Civil. 
National Report England, I.B.b) para. 10. 
Na~onal ReportThe Netherlands,A. Challenging Fatherhood; National Report Switzerland, II.C.6. 
Na twnal Re~ort USA, I.; National Report Canada, I.B. l.; National Report Croatia, A.Il.2.; National 
Repor~ Belgmm, A.II. para. 7; NSW, Australia: Sec. 10(3) Children (Equality of Status) Ad 1976; 
Ontano, Canada:Art. 8 Children'sLaw ReformAct S.O. 1977 Ch. 41· France: Art. 310-3(1) 311-1 
Code Civil. ' ' ' ' 
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Increasingly, acknowledgement by the putative father necessitates the consent of the 
mother and/ or the child above a certain age. 34 By way of contrast, in France, as weil 
as in Austria, such consent is not required; however, mother and child may challenge 
the acknowledgement, or objectto it, respectively.35 Although thelawinEnglanddoes 
not formaily recognise acknowledgement of fatherhood as such, it presumes that if 
a man' s name appears on the birth certificate of the child, he is the child' s father. Again, 
here, this registration requires the consent of the mother.36 
In general, acknowledgement is only possible if no other fatherhood exists, or at least, 
if this is simultaneously chailenged. However, Austria has recently allowed for a 
'breaking through fatherhood acknowledgement', if the child consents thereto.37 
b. Challenging fatherhood 
Originaily, great discrepancies e:xisted between who could chailenge fatherhood 
established under the pater est presumption, and who could challenge fatherhood 
established by acknowledgement. Whereas, as has been shown, with respect to the 
former, fatherhood could only be challenged under very limited conditions, in 
contrast, challenging fatherhood based upon acknowledgement was much easier. 
Today, this situation still prevails in Japan and Switzerland, as weil as in Belgium.38 
Fatherhood by acknowledgement may be challenged by any interested person, 
including bythe state. In most other legal systems, however, both forms of fatherhood 
have been placed on equal footing and a challenge in both cases is permitted by the 
same group of persons and under the same conditions.39 
c. Adjudication 
Many legal systems nowadays allow for adjudication of fatherhood to be initiated 
by either the putative father, the mother, or the child, ifthere is no other fatherhood 
in e:xistence. Since 2004, Austria even allows a so-cailed 'swap-fathers proceedings', 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
8 
See in this regard A. BüCHLER, 'Das Abstammungsrecht in rechtsvergleichender Sicht', (2005) 
FamPra.ch, 437,457. National Report Belgium, A.II., para. 8; National Report Germany, A.II.2.: 
the child must only additionally consent if the mother does not have sole parental custody; National 
Report The Netherlands, A. Establishment ofFatherhood; National Report Serbia, A.I.B. 
National Report Austria, A.II.c.; France: Art. 333 Code Civil. See also National Report Switzerland, 
II.C.3., whereby the consent of the mother and child is not required here, either. 
National Report England, LA.b) para. 7. 
National Report Austria, A.II.c. 
National Report Japan, A.II.2; National Report Switzerland, II.C.5.; National Report Belgium, A.II. 
para. 14. 
National Report Canada, I.B.2.; National Report Denmark, A. Challenging Paternity; France: Art. 
332 et seqq. Code Civil; National Report Germany, A.II.2.; National Report The Netherlands, A. 
Challenging Fatherhood: in the case of fatherhood established by acknowledgement, the Public 
Prosecution Service may apply for nullification. 
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whereby a child may institute proceedings against an alleged father without any time 
lirnit, notwithstanding an established paternity.40 Some legal systems even provide that 
such an action can be brought by the state, or as is the case in England and Belgium, 
by anybody with a legitimate interest.41 
III. MEDICALLY-ASSISTED PROCREATION 
Nowadays, all legal systems provide for special rules in cases of medically-assisted 
procreation.42 At the outset, there is significant divergence as to which methods of, 
and when medically-assisted procreation is permissible. 
Medically-assisted procreation in its most basic form, namely homologous insemina-
tion, does not cause problems in any legal system with respect to determining 
parentage. 
As to the question of who may request treatment with donor sperm, the 'lowest 
common denominator' is a heterosexual married couple. For example, under Swiss 
law, this is the only case of medically-assisted procreation with donor sperm that is 
permissible.43 Other countries also open this possibility to cohabiting heterosexual 
couples, 44 or even lesbian couples. 45 Where the partner consents to insemination with 
donor sperm, usually his or her parentage is presumed and may not be challenged, 
except in cases of vitiated consent. 46 In some legal systems, this not only applies to the 
consenting heterosexual, but also to the consenting homosexual partner.47 Thus, in 
those states that have opened medically-assisted procreation to lesbian couples, it is 
possible forthe child to have two mothers. 48 On the other hand, the donor of the sperm 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
National Report Austria, A.II.d. See also National Report Belgium, A.II. para. 10. 
National Report England, II.B.a) para. 17; National Report Belgium, A.II. para. 14. 
Many legal systems have special statutes dealing with this issue: National Report Austria, A.1.2.: 
Fortpjl.anzungsmedizingesetz(FMedG),BGBll992/275;NationalReportTheNetherlands,A.Assisted 
Reproduction: Embryo Act of 20 June 2002, AssistedReproduction (Donor Information) Act ofl June 
2004; Spain: Ley 14/2006, de 26 de mayo, sobre tecnicas de reproducci6n humana asistida. But see 
National Report Japan, A.1.2.: no law on medically-assisted reproduction. 
National Report Switzerland, II.A. 
National Report Austria, A.I.2.; National Report China/Macau, A.I.2.; National Report Denmark, 
A. Parentage; France: Art. 311-20 Code Civi~ National Report Germany, A.1.2. 
National Report Canada, I. La filiation maternelle; National Report England, II.B.c) para. 19; National 
Report The Netherlands, A. Assisted Reproduction; National Report USA, II. Sweden: § 9 Children 
and Parents Code; Act on Insemination; Act on Fertilization Outside the Body. 
But see National Report Austria, A.I.2. 
National Report Canada, I. La filiation maternelle; National Report USA, II. Sweden: § 9 Children 
and Parents Code. 
National Report Canada, L La filiation maternelle; National Report USA, II. Sweden: § 9 Children 
and Parents Code. 
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may not be called upon as father of the child, nor may he himself seek to have his own 
fatherhood established. 49 In light of the ever-increasing recognition of the right of the 
child to know his or her own origins, many statutes expressly provide that the child 
has the right to access the hospital' s records concerning the donor' s data. 50 There are, 
however, certain states that do not recognise such a right.51 
Additional differences exist amongst the legal systems concerning the question of 
whether egg or embryo donation and surrogacy are allowed. Continental European 
legal orders usually prohibit all kinds of surrogacy, although some of them allow egg 
or embryo donation.52 In contrast, Anglo-American legal systems take a very liberal 
approach and also allow for surrogacy arrangements.53 
In cases of split motherhood, most legal systems still adhere to the principle of mater 
semper certa est.54 This means that the birth-giving wo man is the mother of the child, 
notwithstanding the possible lack of genetic ties to the child. A change of motherhood 
is only possible via adoption. 55 However, under English law, in case of egg donation, 
if all persons involved give their consent, parentage may be changed in favour of the 
couple who want the child. 56 
IV. PROGRESSIVE SUMMARY 
In light of the legal developments described above, it becomes clear that the starting 
point for establishing legal parentage in all legal systems is still the status of marriage. 
Thus, the field of affiliation remains the only area of the law of the child in which 
noticeable differences between children born in and out of wedlock can be discerned. 
This primarily concerns the pater est presumption, although now many legal systems 
place children born in and out of wedlock on an equal footing for the purposes of _ 
challenging fatherhood. 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
10 
National ReportAustria,A.II.l.a); France: Art. 311-19( 1) Code Civil; NationalReportSerbia,A.I.A. 
National Report Switzerland, II.CA. 
National Report Austria, A.I.2 above 14; National Report Belgium, A.II. para. 13: statute proposed; 
National Report England, II.B.a) para. 17; Switzerland: Art. 27 Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz. In general 
see National Report Poland. 
National Report Canada, I. Le droit de l' enfant de connaitre ses origines; National Report Denmark, 
A. Parentage. 
National Report Austria, A.I.2.; National Report Denmark, A. Parentage; National Report The 
Netherlands, A. Assisted Reproduction; National Report Switzerland, II.A.: all such arrangements 
are banned. 
National Report England, I.A.a) para. 5; National Report Canada, I. L'acces ala procreation assistee. 
National Report England, I.A.a) para. 4. 
National Report Canada, I. La filiation maternelle. 
National Report England, I.A.a) para. 5. 
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lt has been shown that, in many legal systems nowadays, a strong tendency can be 
observed towards an increasing recognition ofbiological fatherhood, be it byrestricting 
the pater estpresumption, or by extending the possibilities to challenge it. The reasons 
for this are, firstly, that only recent developments have enabled fatherhood to be 
determined bywayofDNA testing. Secondly, there is a growing awareness of the rights 
of children, and especially the right to know their own origins. 
However, the stress on biological descent mayrun eo unter to a lived-out parent-child 
relationship that, in the interests of the child, has to be maintained. Thus, in many, 
albeit not all legal systems, social parentage has been given priority. This concept is 
further strengthened as a result of the new possibilities in medically-assisted procre-
ation, and its legal consequences. Thus, we are witnessing the dawn of a totally new 
concept of parentage that may be called intentional parentage, whereby parentage is 
linked to the mere intention of the birth mother and another person to assume a 
parental role for the child. 57 Indeed, intentional parentage can be regarded as entering 
a new era in light of the recent decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Canada, 
in the case of A.A. v. B.B. 58 Here, the court held that a child could have three parents, 
namely the biological mother and father of the child, along with the lesbian partner 
of the biological mother, where this was in the child's best interests. However, the 
consistent implementation of this concept, together with the abolition of the 
traditional parentage presumptions, is yet to occur in any legal system. 
C. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
I. NOTION 
Historically, the parent-child relationship was defined by the Roman-law concept of 
patria potestas, namely the right of the father over his - legitimate - children. At the 
most, the mother was entitled to exercise a subsidiary right to bring up the child. 
Conversely, where a child was 'illegitimate', legal responsibility for the child was 
generally not even granted to the parents. 
The first noteworthy change to take place in this area was with respect to the 
terminology used. The old notion of patria potestas has only survived in a select few 
legal systems, and has been replaced by different notions, with the recent trend 
indicating a clear leaning towards parental responsibility. This notion reflects a new 
57 
58 
The concept of intentional parentage is elaborated in I. SCHWENZER, ModelFamily Code, (Antwerp 
- Oxford: Intersentia, 2006), Article 3.5. 
2007 ONCA 2, cf. also National Report Canada, Conclusion. 
Intersentia 11 
Ingeborg Schwenzer 
attitude to the parent-child relationship; it stresses the fact that parents do not only 
have rights, but also duties towards the child, and also brings the rights of the child 
to the forefront. 
II. ATTRIBUTION AT BIRTH 
As concerns parental responsibility, the general distinction mentioned above between 
children born in and out of wedlock still prevails in many legal orders. 
If the parents are married to each other, it goes without saying that the parents have 
joint parental responsibility.59 In those jurisdictions that have recently established a 
registered partnership for heterosexual couples, this principle also extends to these 
relationships.60 In some of these states, this even applies to same-sex couples.61 
If the parents are not married to each other, great divergence can still be observed 
between the differentlegal systems. The most conservative approach can be found in 
Japan, where the father of a child born out of wedlock does not have any right to 
parental 'authority' and no possibility of joint parental 'authority' exists.62 The second 
group oflegal systems, although still favouringthe mother, do recognise the possibility 
of the father gaining parental responsibility jointly with the mother, either by 
registration of an agreement, 63 or by transfer by an authority. 64 Differences exist here 
as to whether the father may be attributed joint parental responsibility against the 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
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National Report Austria, B.I.l.; National Report Belgium, B.I. para. 29; National Report 
China/Macau, B.I. l .; N ationalReport Denmark, B. Allocation of ParentalAuthority; National Report 
Germany,B.I.l.(a);NationalReportJapan,B.I.1.;NationalReportSwitzerland,IV.B.2.2.1.;National 
Report Romania, B.I.l.; National Report Serbia, B.I. 
National Report The Netherlands, B. Attribution of Parental Responsibility. 
National Report Canada, II.A.; National Report The Netherlands, B. Attribution of Parental 
Responsibility: provides for joint parental responsibility onlyif there are no legal familial ties between 
the child and another parent, thus only in lesbian partnerships. 
National Report Japan, B.I.2. 
National Report Denmark, B. Allocation of Parental Authority; National Report The N etherlands, 
B. Attribution of Parental Responsibility; National Report China/Macau, B.I.2.: the declaration to 
the registrar must be coupled with the parents living together in ade facto union. But see National 
Report Austria, B.I.2.: in a quasi-registration procedure, the court must approve an agreement as 
to parental responsibility; National Report Germany, B.I.l.(a) and 2.: § 1626 a Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch: an agreement on joint parental responsibility does not need to be registered in the 
traditional sense, but does need tobe publicly 'certified' (beurkundet). 
National Report England, I.A.b) para. 7: where the father is not registered on the birth certificate 
and the mother does not agree. But see National Report The N etherlands, B. Attribution of Parental 
Responsibility: the unmarried father may ask the court to attribute joint parental responsibility 
against the wishes of the mother. 
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wishes of the mother.65 In the third group, which is ever-increasing, parental 
responsibility automatically comes into existence once legal parentage is established. 66 
Thus, children born in and out of wedlock are genuinely placed on equal footing. 
III. CHANGE OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Whereas fi:ftyyears ago, it was clear that upon the divorce of married parents, parental 
authority had tobe attributed to one parent alone, it is common ground nowadays, 
that ongoing joint parental responsibilitymust, at thevery least, be possible. The only 
legal system that does not followthis approach is Japan; however, Switzerland also only 
allows such joint parental responsibility under limited conditions.67 In the great 
majority oflegal systems, neither a divorce nor a factual or legal separation of either 
married or non-married parents influences the attribution of parental responsibility. 
The joint parental responsibility of both parents automatically subsists.68 If, after 
divorce, parental responsibility is entrusted to one parent only, the attribution has to 
be made according to the best interests of the child. Although there are no longer any 
presumptions that favour the mother or the father, in a number oflegal systems, at 
least young children are still generally entrusted to the mother.69 
Differences do exist in the.context of the question as to how parental responsibility 
is attributed in the event that the sole holder of parental responsibility dies or becomes 
incapacitated. Whereas in some legal systems, social parentage is given priority, 70 many 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
NationalReportAustria, B.I.2.: mother's consent necessary; National Report Denmark, B. Allocation 
of Parental Authority: cannot obtain joint parental responsibility against the mother's wishes, 
however, he can apply to have sole parental responsibility transferred to him; National Report 
Germany, B.I.2.: father is not able to obtain parental responsibility against the will of the mother; 
National Report The Netherlands, B. Attribution of Parental Responsibility: can now obtain joint 
parental responsibility against the mother's wishes. 
National Report Belgium, B.L para. 30; National Report Canada, ILA.; National Report Croatia, 
B.I.2.: follows as a consequence of establishing paternity; National Report England, LA.b) para. 7; 
National Report Serbia, B.L 
National Report Japan, B.II.2.; National Report Switzerland, N.B.3.3.2. 
National ReportAustria, B.II.2., however, the child' s first residence must be stated; National Report 
Belgium, B.IL para. 33; National Report Canada, II.B.2.; National Report Croatia, B.II.3.; National 
Report Denmark, B. Allocation of Parental Authority; National Report England, LB.a) para. 9; 
National Report Germany, B.II.2.; National Report The Netherlands, B. Change of Parental 
Responsibility. 
National ReportAustria, B.II.3.; National Report Canada, II.B.2. Les differentes formes de garde; 
National Report Japan, B.II.3. 
National Report England, LB.a) para. 9; National Report The Netherlands, B. Stepfamilies and 
Parental Responsibility; National Report USA, III.A. 
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others still clearlyfavour the surviving biological parent by automaticallytransferring 
parental responsibility to him or her.71 
IV. STEPFAMILIES 
In determining the question of whether third parties may also, in addition to or instead 
of the original-most often the biological-parents, be attributed with parental 
responsibility, particularly stepparents, a legal system most clearly reveals its attitude 
to issues of parentage. Here, the question of recognition of purely social parentage is 
to be addressed. 
lt comes as no great surprise that, still to this day, most legal systems strictly limit the 
very notion of parental responsibility to legal parents, although some put a support 
obligation on stepparents.72 lt is only by adoption that the stepparent can obtain füll 
responsibilitywith equal rights and duties to those of a parent. 73 If at all, in these states, 
stepparents who are married to74 or are living in a registered same-sex partnership75 
with the legal parent have the possibility of taking part in the exercise of parental 
responsibility together with the parent, which is sometimes called a 'minor' right of 
parental responsibility. 
However, in recent years, a select few states have enabled the possibility for parental 
responsibilityto be transferred to a stepparent. 76 This usually presupposes that consent 
of the legal parent is given and/ or a respective order by the competent authority. In 
general, it is, furthermore, only possible if the stepparent is married to the legal 
parent. 77 Some states now also provide for this possibility for same-sex registered 
partners;78 a few even for any third party, irrespective of whether he or she lives in a 
71 
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National Report Austria, B.II. l .; National Report China/Macau, B.II. l .; National Report Denmark, 
B. Impairment/Death of the Holder of ParentalAuthority;National Report Germany, B.II.1.( a),(b ): 
regard is also given to the child' s best interests; National Report Switzerland, IV.B.3.3.1. 
National Report China/Macau, B.III. l .; National Report Croatia, B.III. l .; National Report England, 
I.B.a) para. 9: the support obligation exists for any 'child of the family' and continues after divorce; 
National Report Serbia, B.II. See also National Report Switzerland, IV.B.2.2.3. 
For stepparent adoption see E.II. below. 
National Report Canada, II.C.2.; National Report Germany, B.I.3.; National Report Switzerland, 
IV.B.2.2.3. 
National Report Germany, B.I.3.; National Report Switzerland, N.B.2.2.4. 
National Report Denmark, B. Allocation of Parental Authority; National Report England, I.B.a) 
para. 9; National Report The Netherlands, B. Stepfamilies and Parental Responsibility. 
National Report Denmark, B. Allocation of Parental Authority; National Report Canada, II.C.l.; 
National Report England, I.B.a) para. 9. 
National Report The Netherlands, B. Stepfamilies and Parental Responsibility. 
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formalised or a non-formalisedrelationship with the child' s parent. 79 As a special case, 
The Netherlands does not even require a transfer of parental responsibility, provided 
that the child was born during the marriage or registered partnership between the 
mother and her new partner, and does not have legal ties to the other parent. 80 At this 
stage, however, there is no legal system that recognises the possibility for parental 
responsibility to be attributed to more than two persons. 
Upon the dissolution of the stepparent relationship, the tendencyin most legal systems 
is still to favour the original parent, irrespective of the interests of the child. This is 
not only true in the case of divorce or separation of the stepparent from the original 
parent, but also in the case of the dissolution of the relationship due to the latter' s 
death. In such a case, many legal systems hold that the child should return to the 
surviving biological parent, even if no social parentage exists. 81 In some legal systems, 
only if the child' s best interests are endangered, the court may order, as a child 
protection measure, that he or she remain with the stepparent.82 
In the context of stepfamilies, there are only a few legal systems that actually take the 
concept of social parentage seriously and, thus, treat the dissolution of the steppar-
ent/parent relationship in the same way as that of the original parents. Parental 
responsibility is then attributed exclusively on the basis of the best interests of the child. 
Here, ongoing joint parental responsibility can also be upheld. 83 This possibility is of 
particular significance for same-sex partnerships if the respective legal system neither 
provides for intentional parentage, nor allows stepchild adoption in such a case, or 
this has not, in fact, taken place.84 
V. POSTER FAMILIES 
In most legal systems, foster parents are not granted parental responsibility; their 
capacityis limited to the day-to-day care of the child. Some countries provide a special 
definition for the position held by foster parents; Swiss law, for example, specifies that 
they represent the parents to the extent that it is necessary for the fulfilment of their 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
National Report TheNetherlands, B. Attribution of Parental Responsibility. See also National Report 
Belgium, B.I. para. 30: proposition to amend Civil Code. 
National Report The Netherlands, B. Attribution of Parental Responsibility. 
National Report Serbia, B.III. 
Germany: § 1682 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
National ReportDenmark, B. Stepfamilies; National Report England, I.B.a) para. 9; National Report 
The Netherlands, B. Stepfamilies and Parental Responsibility. 
National Report USA, II. 
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duties. 85 A similar rule can be found in English law for the purpose of safeguarding 
the child's welfare.86 
In some legal systems, certain aspects of parental responsibility can be transferred to 
foster parents bythe competent authority. 87 A few countries even allow for the transfer 
of parental responsibility as a whole upon an application by the foster parents.88 
U nder traditional notions of parental responsibility, it is clear that the original parents 
are given priority over foster parents in cases of conflict. 89 In light of the growing 
sensitivity to the best interests of the child, however, it is no langer possible to simply 
remove a child from the foster family at will. Many legal systems now incorporate 
'safeguards' that restrict the removal of the child from the foster family in circum-
stances where such action would result in endangering the best interests of the child 
by disturbing an established family bond. A prominent example can be found in Dutch 
law, where the child can only be removed with the consent of a foster family if it has 
resided with the family for a year or more.90 
VI. PROGRESSIVE SUMMARY 
With respect to the developments discussed above, it can fairly be stated that the status 
of marriage has lost its controlling position regarding the attribution of parental 
responsibility. This is not only shown by the fact that, after divorce, joint parental 
responsibility has continually gained ground and practical significance in recent 
decades, but also by the fact that non-married parents are now widely placed on an 
equal footing with those who are married. 
However, the very concept of parental responsibility still mirrors the ideal of the 
nuclear family comprised of mother, father, and child. This is firstly demonstrated by 
the many legal systems which cannot conceive transferring parental responsibility to 
a non-parent. Furthermore, even where this is possi~le, attributing parental responsi-
bility to more than two persons is yet to find acceptance. 
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National Report Switzerland, IV.B.4. 
National Report England, I.B. para. 9; sirnilarly, National Report Romania, B.IV.l. , 
National Report Austria, B.IV.2.; National Report Germany, B.IV.2. 
National Report Austria, B.IV.2, which also requires the consent of the parents thereto; National 
Report England, I.B. para. 9. 
National Report Austria, B.IV.3.: however, this is not the case if parental responsibility has been 
transferred to the foster parents. National Report Japan, B.IV.3. 
National Report The Netherlands, B. Poster Families and Custody. See also National Report 
Germany, B.IV.3.; National Report Switzerland, IV.B.4. 
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Conceming the tension between biological and social conceptions of parentage in the 
field of parental responsibility, biological-or, at least presumed biological-ties often 
take priority over the lived-out reality of social parentage, although a slow abandon-
ment of this concept can be observed in circumstances where the best interests of the 
child dictate otherwise. 
D. CONTACT 
I. GENERAL 
Whereas access and visitation were once perceived as exclusive rights of parents 
regarding their children, this view has recently changed, with such rights being 
regarded as mutually belongingto both parents and children. This change in approach 
can be largely attributed to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 91 
The modern term 'contact' thereby encompasses more than just visitation. There is 
consensus that other forms of communication, such as telephone, postal, or email 
contact, are also part of the right of contact. Furthermore, many legal systems today 
also acknowledge a right to information.92 The aim of this right is similar to that of 
contact; namely, to protect the child' s emotional ties in his or her existing relationships. 
As joint post-divorce parenting is gaining more and more ground, the very term 
'contact' is regarded sceptically with respect to parents.93 
II. PERSONS 
In all legal systems, there is a right of contact between the child and his or her parents. 
This holds true for parents who do not live with the child, regardless of whether or 
not they hold parental responsibility.94 The right to visitation aims to maintain the 
personal relationship between parents and children. In most legal systems, the marital 
status of the parents is irrelevant, with the exception ofJapan.95 The unmarriedfather 
91 
92 
93 
95 
Art. 9(3) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. But see National Report Belgium, C.I. 
para. 38. 
National Report Austria, C.I.; National Report Denmark, C. General. 
National Report The Netherlands, C. General. 
National Report Japan, C.II.l.; National Report Romania, C.II.l.; National Report Serbia, C.I.; 
National Report Switzerland, N.C.I. l. 
National Report Japan, C.II. l., where, although visitation may be granted after divorce, may not 
be in the case where the parents were never married. 
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has the right to visit the child as weil, in order to build up a social parent-child 
relationship. This has even been held by the European Court of Human Rights in a 
case in which a five-year-old child had never had contact with his father and, since 
birth, had been living with foster parents, despite the fact that numerous German 
courts had denied the father' s right of access to his son on the basis that this would 
not have been in the best interests of the child.96 
With the exception ofDenmark97 and J apan,98 which restricts contact to that between 
legal parents and the child, most other legal systems nowadays provide for a right of 
contact between the child and other persons. 
Many legal systerris have long recognised the right of contact of grandparents, which 
is based on the biological ties.99 This right gains special importance in light ofthe ever-
growing number of divorces, whereas enforcement in cases where the parents are still 
living together, but do not wish the child to have contact with the grandparents, is 
usually denied. 100 Likewise, contact with siblings is also recognised in many legal 
systems.101 However, a counter-movement can already be discerned againstthis trend 
to extend contact rights to other relatives. Most prominently, the United States 
Supreme Court, in Troxel v. Granville, 102 decided that the privacy right of the parents 
specificallyincludes the power to exclude or limit the child' s contact with other, more 
distant family members.103 
In an ever-growing number of states, contact rights may also be granted to third 
persons who are not biologically related to the child, if this is in the best interests of 
the child. 104 The predominant aim pursued by this right is to allow the child 
to maintain a relationship to persons with whom he or she has established significant 
emotional ties. Therefore, some legal systems expresslymention persons with whom 
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ECHR 26 February2004, Case No. 74969/01, Görgülü v. Gerinany, 2005 FamPra.ch, 93 et seqq. 
National Report Denmark, C. Conditions for Contact. Eor further Scandinavian approaches see 
BOELE-W OELKI et al, European Family Law in Action Volume III: Parental responsibilities, (Antwerp 
-Oxford: Intersentia, 2005), 577 et seqq. 
National Report Japan, C.II.1. 
National Report Austria, C.I.; National Report Belgium, C.II. para. 41; National Report Germany, 
C.I. 
National Report Austria, C.II. l. 
National Report Croatia, C.II.l.; National Report Germany, C.I. 
530 u.s. 57 (2000). 
For the whole discussion, see National Report USA, III.B. 
National Report Austria, C.II. l .; National Report Belgium, C.II. para. 42; National Report England, 
I.B.a) para. 9; National Report Tue Netherlands, C. Persons and Conditions; National Report 
Canada, III.A.; National Report Serbia, C.I.; National Report Switzerland, N.C.I.2.: exceptional 
circumstances must also be present. 
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a 'socio-familial' relationship exists105 or persons who have acted in loco parentis.106 
In practice, the contact ofthe child withstepparents, fosterparents, orformerpartners 
of parents will be at stake here. The right of contact by so-called third persons may 
also be of particular significance for same-sex partners who have a 'common child' 
in jurisdictions where there is no legal basis to secure parentage for the non-biological 
parent. 
III. ENFORCEMENT 
lt is almost unanimously held that visitation rights can be enforced against the holder 
of parental responsibility with whom the child is residing.107 However, the growing 
awareness of the rights of the child and the realisation that contact is not only a right 
of the parents, but also a right of the child, has led many jurisdictions to conclude that 
contact will not be enforced against the wishes of the child.108 In this context, some 
legal orders expressly provide for a veto right of the child above a certain age.109 
IV. PROGRESSIVE SUMMARY 
The right of contact, formerly access and visitation, aptly reflects the developments 
in the conception of parent-child relationships. Initially, focus was placed jointly on 
status and immediate biological ties. This was then extended to encompass the 
grandparents' and the unmarried father' s right to have contact to the child, which was, 
again, a reference to the biological ties between the child and his or her lineal relatives. 
Nowadays, the extension of contact rights to third persons is to be attributed to 
increasing acceptance of the concept of social parentage, albeit not without a 
backlash from times in which purely biological notions reigned.110 
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National Report Germany, C.II.1. 
Ireland, see BOELE-WOELKI (fn. 97), 589. 
National Report Denmark, C. Enforcement of Contact; National Report The Netherlands, C. 
Enforcement of Contact. 
National Report Belgium, C.III. para. 45; National Report Canada, III.C.2.; National Report 
Denmark, C. Hearing of the Child; National Report Switzerland, N.C.II. 
National Report Austria, C.II.2. (14 years); National Report The Netherlands, C. Persons and 
Conditions (12 years). 
ECHR 26 February 2004, Case No. 74969/01, Görgülü v. Germany, 2005 FamPra.ch, 93 et seqq. 
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E. ADOPTION 
I. GENERAL 
Historically, adoption was viewed as an institution to safeguard the interests of 
childless-at least, sonless-adopters. Thus, the adoption of adults was at the forefront, 
and not the adoption of minor children. Relicts of this concept can be found in 
J apanese law, which, to this very day, still bases adoption on the private contract 
between adopter and adoptee. m In principle, Austria still follows this approach as weil, 
although the contract between adopter and adoptee must be ratified by the court. 112 
This archaic concept has been abandoned by all other legal systems discussed. 
The main focus today is on the adoption of minor children, whereby adoption is seen 
as a measure of child protection, with the intention that the adoptive family relation-
ship shouldmirror, to the greatest extent possible, the biological familyrelationship. 113 
However, in actual fact, on the one hand, a certain return to the historical intention 
of benefiting the adopters can be seen in modern tim es, as adoption is increasingly 
becoming a means for childless couples to obtain a longed-for child. This group is 
joined by child-seeking same-sex couples. On the other hand, as the growing number 
of patchwork families often wish to disguise this veryfact and establish the appearance 
of a 'normal' family, stepparent adoptions have become commonplace. 
II. WHO MAY ADOPT WHOM? 
All legal systems provide for joint, as weil as single adoption. 
The starting point for joint adoption, again, has been, and still is-to a wide de-
gree-status, as joint adoption was originallyallowed for heterosexual married couples 
only. To this very day, there are many legal systems that still restrict joint adoption 
accordingly. 114 
III 
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National Report Japan, D.I. 
National Report Austria, D.I. 
National ReportAustria, D.I.; National Report Germany, D.I.; National Report The Netherlands, 
D. General. 
National Report Austria, D .II.1.; National Report Denmark, D. Persons who may Adopt; National 
Report Germany, D .II.1.; National Report Greece, D .II. l .; National Report Japan, D .II. l .; National 
Report Switzerland, III.B.1.1. 
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In several countries, this concept has been expanded in two directions. Some states 
now also allow heterosexual non-married cohabitees to adopt jointly.115 With the 
official recognition of same-sex partnerships, be it by registration or by opening up 
the institution of marriage, some of these states also allow same-sex couples in a 
registered partnership or marriage to adopt jointly.116 However, the majority oflegal 
systems, despite providing for the possibility to register a same-sex partnership, do 
not go so far as to extend joint adoption to such couples. Most interestingly, courts 
in the USA, in which many stätes refuse to statutorily recognise same-sex registered 
partnerships or marriages, have still long allowed this procedure through case law. u? 
The most advanced position concerning joint adoption is represented by Quebec 
and British Columbia, Canada, as weil as The Netherlands. These states allow 
practically any two persons who want to assume joint responsibility for a child to 
jointly adopt. 118 
Although single parent adoption is provided for in most legal systems, 119 it is 
sometimes restricted if the person wishing to adopt is married.120 A further remarkable 
exception to the possibility of single parent adoption can be found in Switzerland, 
wherebyupon entering into a registered same-sex partnership, a person generally loses 
anyright to adopt a child. 121 Thus, it would appear that homosexual couples are better 
off not registering their partnership if one of them intends to adopt a child. 
Regardless of the legal possibility of single parent adoption, as a matter of fact, these 
cases are f ew and far between in practice, as pref erence tends tobe given to the- ever-
increasing - surplus of couples wishing to adopt a child. 
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National Report China/Macau, D .II. l .; National Report England, II.B.c) para. 19; National Report 
Serbia, D.2. 
Belgium: Art. 343 § 1 Code Civil; National Report England, II.B.c) para. 19; National Report The 
Netherlands, D. Who may adopt whom?; Sweden: Chapter 3 § 1 Registered Partnership Act; Spain: 
Art. 1 LEY 13/2005, de 1 de julio, por la quese modifica el C6digo Civil en materia de derecho a contraer 
matrimonio. 
National Report USA, I. 
National Report Canada, IV.B. l.; National Report The Netherlands, D. Who may adopt whom?, 
restricted to domestic adoption. 
But cf. National Report Serbia, D.2. 
National Report Austria, D .II. l ., if the spouses have been separated for at least three years, or one 
spousehas been of unknown residence for atleast oneyear, or for otherimportantreasons; National 
Report Croatia, D.II.3.: other spouse must consent; National Report Romania, 2.II.3.: the consent 
of the other spouse is required; National Report Switzerland, III.B.1.1.2.; Art. 264b(2) 
Zivilgesetzbuch-only if joint adoption not possible or if spouses legally separated for more than three 
years; Germany: § 1749(1) Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
National Report Switzerland, III.B.1.1. 
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A special form of single parent adoption is stepparent adoption, whereby one partner 
adopts the biological child of his or her partner. Most legal systems provide for 
stepparent adoption if the partners are married,122 or, in some legal systems, merely 
cohabiting.123 Whereas stepparent adoption was initially refused to registered same-sex 
partners, in the meantime, many legislators have at least made this possibility available 
to the non-:biological partner in order to acquire parentage.124 
There is a special need for stepparent adoption where it is not possible to otherwise 
legally secure the position of a stepparent in relation to the child, especially where 
parental responsibility cannot be granted to third persons. With the growing 
recognition of social parentage, the need to 'legalise' the relationship by means of 
stepparent adoption is of diminishing relevance. Thus, it is only consistent that The 
N etherlands, which provide for the possibility of joint parental responsibility of the 
stepparent and the natural parent without the need for the stepparent to adopt the 
child, tend to restrict stepparent adoption. 125 
All legal systems have age limits with respect to the adopter, setting both a minimum 
age, and, since recent tim es, also a maximum age. The changing concept of adoption, 
as it has been described above, has firstly led to a reduction in the minimum age 
required for the adopter. In the legal systems discussed here, it ranges between 18126 
and 30127 and usually differs depending on whether joint or single / stepparent 
adoption, orwhether domestic or international adoption is intended.128 Secondly, some 
states nowadays have also introduced a maximum age for adopters. 129 Additionally, 
most legal systems provide for age differences between the adopter and the child, with 
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National Report Austria, D.II.2.-3.; National Report Belgium, D.II. para. 54; National Report 
Denmark, D. Persons who may Adopt, which allows stepchild adoption byregistered partners, but 
not those merely cohabiting; National Report Canada, IV.D.l.; National Report China/Macau, 
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Civil. 
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National Report The Netherlands: in the case of international adoption, maximum age limits are 
set for the adopters; France: Art. 343 Code Civil (28 years). 
NationalReportGreece,D.II.2(60years);NationalReportTheNetherlands,D.Agelimitsandother 
Prerequisites (42 years); National Report Serbia, D.I. (35 years). 
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minimum age differences ranging between 16 and 18 years.130 In the few legal systems 
that set maximum age differences, these range between 40 and 50 years. 131 Again, all 
these parameters are intended to bring, in the best interests of the child, the adopter-
child relationship as close as possible to that of a natural parent-child relationship. 
The fact that, as far as couples are concerned, many legal systems require a minimum 
period of cohabitation or marriage for the adopters, is also regarded as being in the 
best interests of the child. This period usually ranges from two to five years.132 An 
interesting exception to this rule can be found in Denmark and The N etherlands. In 
those countries, stepchild adoption is permitted at an earlier date for women in a 
registered partnership with a newborn child, where one of the women was fertilised 
with donor sperm. 133 This again provides arnple proof of how stepchild adoption is 
often utilised where other rneans of securing parentage are lacking. 
III. CONSENT BY NATURAL PARENTS 
lt has always been cornrnon ground that both parents of a child born in wedlock had 
to consent to his or her adoption; similarly, at least, the rnother of a child born out 
of wedlock had to consent and this was regarded as indispensable. Sorne jurisdictions 
even require the consent of grandparents. N owadays, rnost legal systerns have gone 
one step further, and also require the consent of the unrnarried father. If consent 
cannot be obtained at all frorn these persons, or where the refusal would endanger the 
interests of the child, such consent can be dispensed with. 
Furthermore, as adoption can only be granted in the best interests of the child, in rnany 
legal systems, the consent of the child is also necessary. Consistent with the right of 
self-determination, above a certain age, the child has to consent in person.134 
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National Report Belgium, D.II. para. 56: 15 years; National Report China/Macau, D.II.4.: 18 years; 
National Report Romania, 2.II.4.: 18 years, but for good grounds, a difference of 15 years may be 
allowed; National Report Serbia, D.l.: 18 years; National Report Switzerland, II.B.l.: 16 years. 
National Report China/Macau, D.II.4.: 50 years; National Report Denmark, D. Persons who may 
Adopt (40 years); France: Art. 344(1) Code Civil (50 years). 
National Report China/Macau, D.II.l.: if married, three years, if cohabiting, five years; National 
Report Denmark, D. Persons who may Adopt (two-and-a-halfyears); France: Art. 343 Code Civil 
( two years); National Report The N etherlands, D. Age limits and other Prerequisites ( three years); 
National Report Switzerland, III.B.1.1. ( five years). 
National Report Denmark, D. Persons who may Adopt; National Report The Netherlands, Who 
may adopt whom? 
N ationalReport Belgium, D .III. para. 60: 12 years; National Report China/Macau, D .III.2.: 12 years; 
National Report Croatia, D .III.2.: 12 years; National Report Japan, D .III.2.: 15 years; National Report 
Germany, D.III.2.a): 14 years; National Report Canada, IV.C.: ten years; National Report Greece, 
D.II.6.: 12 years; NationalReportDenmark, D. Conditions for Adoption: 12 years; National Report 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES 
In earlier times, many legal systems differentiated between füll and simple adoption. 
This approach is only followed nowadays by Japan, France and Belgium. 135 As a 
remnant of simple adoption, Austria provides that, notwithstanding adoption, the 
natural parent has a subsidiary obligation to pay child support and the child's 
inheritance rights are upheld. 136 Most legal systems nowadays, however, follow the 
concept of füll adoption, whereby all legal ties to the biological parents cease to exist 
and the child is treated as if he or she was a natural child of the adopters, with all 
ensuing legal consequences. However, most recently, in some legal systems, the concept 
of füll adoption has come under attack. 137 In light of the fact that it may be in the best 
interests of the child, at least in some cases, that not all ties to the biological parents 
are severed, for example under English and Quebec law, a combination of adoption 
and contact is possible. 138 There are also discussions currently taking place in The 
N etherlands concerning some form of 'light' adoption.139 
Parallel to the concept of füll adoption, most legal systems nowadays follow the 
principle that adoption is confidential rather than open.140 However, as with the 
discussions on füll and simple adoption, recent times have seen a relaxing of this 
principle to allow exceptions. 141 
Irrespective of these discussions, a growing number of states recognise the right of the 
child to know his or her own origins, which also has consequences in the area of 
adoption. Thus, many legal systems now provide that the adopted child, after having 
reached a certain age, must have access to information concerning his or her natural 
parents.142 
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Romania, 2.III.2.: ten years; National Report Serbia, D.l.: ten years; National Report Switzerland, 
III.B.l.: 14 years. 
NationalReportJapan,D.IV.l.; France:Art. 343 etseqq. (full),Art. 360etseqq. (simple) Code Civil; 
National Report Belgium, D.IV. para. 62. 
National Report Austria, D.N.l. 
National Report Germany, D .IV. l.; National Report The N etherlands, D. Consequences of Adoption; 
National Report England, I.B.b) para. 10. 
National Report England, I.B.b) para. 10; National Report Canada, IV.A. 
National Report The Netherlands, D. Consequences of Adoption. 
National Report China/Macau, D.IV.2. Butsee National ReportAustria, D.I., adoption as a general 
rule is open. 
National Report Canada, IV.A.; National Report Romania, 2.III.2.: solely for medical reasons. 
National Report Austria, D.IV.2. (16 years); National Report Belgium, D.IV. para. 63 (12 years); 
National Report Canada, IV.D .2. ( 14 years ); N ationalReport Croatia, D.IV.2. ( seven years); National 
ReportEngland,II.B.a) para.17 (18years);NationalReportGermany,D.IV.2. (16years); National 
Report Greece, D.II.9. (18 years); National Report Serbia, D.1./4. (15 years); National Report 
Switzerland, III.C. (18 years). 
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V. AVOIDANCE OF ADOPTION 
In all legal systems, avoidance of adoption is severely restricted, as it usually runs 
counter tq the best interests of the child. In Belgium, this only applies to 'füll' 
adoptions; simple adoptions may be revoked on severe grounds.143 In many legal 
systems, avoidance may only be declared where grave procedural errors in the adoption 
process have occurred;144 other reasons include cases where a joint applicationis made 
by the adopter and the child. 145 Both of these grounds for avoidance still reflect the 
form er contractU:al nature of adoption. A more modern ground for avoidance is where 
the best interests of the child demand it.146 Of particular interest is The N etherlands, 
where it is exclusively up to the adopted child to apply for avoidance within two to 
five years after having reached the age of majority.147 
Upon avoidance of the adoption, the legal ties between the adopter and the child 
usually cease to exist, whereas those to the natural parents are restored. 
VI. PROGRESSIVE SUMMARY 
Even nowadays, where adoption is seen as a means of child protection, according 
to which the best interests of the child should prevail, adoption law still retains an 
implicit preference for biological parentage.148 Adoption, as it now stands, still 
reinforces the weight attributed to marital status in the law of the child and the ideal 
of the nuclear family. Thus, the step towards real acknowledgement of social parentage, 
also in light of same-sex partnerships, is yet to be taken. The first indications of 
such change have, at this stage, only been touched upon within the scope of debate 
conceming the limitation of the stepparent adoption and the relaxing of the principle 
of füll adoption. 
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National Report Belgium, D.V. para. 65. 
National Report Austria, D.V.l.; National Report Germany, D.V.1. 
National Report Austria, D .V. l .; National Report Denmark, D. Revocation of Adoption; National 
Report Greece, D.II.10. 
National Report Austria, D. V.1.; National Report Denmark, D. Revocation of Adoption; National 
Report Germany, D.V.l. 
National Report The Netherlands, D. Revocation of Adoption. 
National Report USA, I.; N. DETHLOFF, 'Same-Sex Parents in a Comparative Perspective', (2005) 
7 International Law FORUM du drnit international, 195 at 196. 
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F. SUMMARY 
The 1990s have often been called 'the decade of the child'. Indeed, the ratification of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child created a break-through in defi.ning 
the rights of children. In the aftermath of the success of this Convention, 149 major 
changes in the law concerning children were prompted in most legal systems. Today, 
everywhere, the best interests of the child are given predominant consideration. 
Whereas, until recently, the parent-child relationship was largely dominated by the 
question of whether the parents of the child were married or not, most recent 
developments have shown a considerable reduction in the relevance of status; instead, 
notions of social parentage have been steadily gaining ground in recent years. However, 
a certain counter-current can be discerned that places emphasis on genetic parentage. 
This, in turn, has led to new tensions arising between social parentage and genetic 
parentage. 
These developments are reflected in all areas of the law relating to parents and children. 
In the law of affi.liation, the pater est rule is gradually losing ground, although in many 
legal systems it still plays a significant role. With regard to parental responsibility, this 
reduced focus on status has led to the development that not only divorced parents, 
but also unmarried parents and even third persons can be hoiders of parental 
responsibility. Likewise, in the area of contact, it is now generally acknowledged that 
third persons may qualify to have contact with the child. Adoption is still one of the 
few areas that focus on status as the ideal, but even here, in some legal systems, a 
tendency to attenuate the importance of heterosexual marriage can be discerned. 
In summary, the current situation may be characterised as beingin a state oftransition. 
The nuclear, marriage-basedfamilyis slowly being replaced byintentional parentage, 
whereby all legal consequences of the parent-child relationship are assessed on the facts 
of the individual case, thereby genuinely promoting the best interests of the child. 
149 As of 8 May 2006, the state parties to the UN CRC numbered 192. 
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